Old Hickory's Weblog

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has out a 07/14/06 updated draft paper on Lebanese Security and the Hezbollah.  Cordesman is always worth paying attention to, even when he's off-base on policy (as in his surprising support of Bush's "stay the course" non-policy on the Iraq War).

Cordesman gives some important background to the current conflict:

Lebanon is still recovering from a long period of religious civil war between these factions that began in the 1970s, and from the Israeli and Syrian occupations that resulted from Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It suffered from repeated Syrian interventions in Lebanon’s civil war before 1982, and Syria effectively dominated Lebanon once its troops and intelligence services moved into Lebanon as part of the Taif Accords peace settlement in 1990.

It is still far from clear whether Lebanon will remain united and avoid future civil conflicts. There are still serious tensions between virtually all factions and Lebanon’s Shi’ite have become more assertive in recent years. The Taif Accord did, however, create a political system that gave Muslims and other non-Maronite groups a larger role in the political system that more accurately reflected their share of the population while ensuring that all major sectarian groups would have some representation at the top of the government by requiring that given posts be held by a representative of given groups.

There have been several elections since the end of the civil war in 1990,and a major drop in civil violence. Many sectarian militias have been weakened, partially disarmed, or disbanded, although every major group retains arms and some militia capability. However, key Shi’ite militias like Amal and the ezbollah have never been disarmed. Syrian forces have officially left Lebanon, but Syria and the Syrian security services still play a major political role in Lebanon. Both Syria and Iran continue to arm and support the Hezbollah and use it as a proxy, and both use Lebanon to funnel arms and money to anti-Israeli Palestinian factions.

The following is a very important point, which I haven't yet seen mentioned in the mainstream press coverage of the current crisis:

Israel left South Lebanon in 2000, after years of low intensity civil conflict with Shi’ite militias like Hezbollah and Amal.  While Israel viewed this withdrawal as a strategic choice and part of its effort to create a peace process with Syria and the other Arab states, it had failed to secure the area, and Hezbollah was largely credited in Lebanon and much of the Arab world with “defeating” the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] in asymmetric warfare. Hezbollah forces remain in the Israel-Lebanese border area and Hezbollah has shown it retains the ability to strike across the border at Israel and inflict damage to Israel forces at the border. ...

Many Lebanese Shi’ites see local movements like the Hezbollah as a guarantee to their security, and even many non-Shi’ites see it as the force that defeated Israel and forced it to end its occupation of Southern Lebanon. Other movements have remained in Lebanon because of Syrian pressure, or because the Lebanese government was not willing to confront them. At the same time, the Lebanese security and intelligence forces have been heavily penetrated by Syria and many other Lebanese have good reason to distrust them.  (my emphasis)

Also blissfully absent in the mainstream press reports I've seen is the following, which puts into perspective how unrealistic (though theoretically legitimate) it is for Israel to demand that the Lebanese army take military control of the Shi'a-dominated southern part of the country controlled by Hizbollah:

Lebanese forces are lightly armed, poorly organized for maneuver warfare, and lacked both a meaningful air force and modern land-based air defense assets. ... Lebanon’s military forces remain small and totaled some 72,100 actives in 2006, including some 22,600 conscripts. It was unclear, however, that all this strength was actually present.  It is also clear ... that Lebanese forces have lacked the resources to make many major moves toward modernization and recapitalization in recent years.

Lebanese forces have moved towards a higher degree of unity, and many Lebanese officers are deeply committed to avoiding any further civil conflict, Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs, or clashes with Israel that could affect the country’s recovery and development.  Nevertheless, the Lebanese command structure reflects the nation’s serious religious divisions.  The President is the commander of the army and is Maronite Christian, the Deputy Commander is a Muslim (Shi’ite), and the Army Council had Druze and Sunni members.  (my emphasis)

That's not to say that the Lebanese government has not been willing to tolerate and encourage anti-Israeli private militias.  On the contrary, as Cordesman report explains in some detail.  He also makes clear that Hizbollah is a determined anti-Israeli force:

In October 2000, Al Manar broadcast speeches by [Hizbollah leader] Sheik [Hassan] Nasrallah that were clearly designed to incite Palestinian hostility. One such speech included a call to stab Israelis to death: “If you don’t have bullets, who among you doesn’t have knives?  Hide the knife, and when he comes close to the enemy let him stab him.  Let the stab be fatal.” In another instance, Sheik Nasrallah appeared on the independent al-Jazeera and addressed the Palestinians as “holy war comrades-in-arms,” and proposed a strategy of gradually escalating the uprising from stones to daggers to firearms and other means of military combat.  He also reportedly encouraged Palestinians to fight Israelis using suicide operations.

Hezbollah has since offered continued political support and guidance to Palestinian fighters. In October 2000, Nasrallah stated that Hezbollah was concerned with all Israeli prisoners, “whether Lebanese, Palestinian or Arab.”  He also exhorted Arab leaders to protect the Palestinian struggle “by providing support and assistance to Palestinians fighting Israeli troops.”  Then in January 2001, he pledged to Palestinian families that he would work to secure the release of their loved ones from Israeli jails.  Later that year in August, he told his fighters to prepare to join the Intifada (although they have yet to participate actively in the uprising).  Finally, in April 2002, Nasrallah made public overtures to the Israeli government to bargain for the lives of Palestinian fighters threatened by IDF forces.  However, a framework for an Israeli-Hezbollah prisoner release agreement was not reached until late 2003 and no exchanges took place until early 2004.