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A verdict on the “surge”
Thursday, January 3, 2008
5:47:00 PM EST
Feeling Anxious
Three developments in Iraq since the middle of 2007 are noteworthy.
The first is the success of the U.S. in arming and funding Arab Sunnis in the Anbar Province and Baghdad to stop shooting at U.S. soldiers and to fight Al-Qaeda. Named Awakening forces, these have grown to more than 70,000 men. “Awakening” men patrol local areas. They get paid about $10 a day each by the U.S. Many were formerly a part of the Sunni insurgency against the occupiers and Iraqi government security forces as well as against the Shi'a militias of AbdulAziz Al-Hakeem (Badr brigade) and of Muqtada Al-Sadr (Mahdi army).
The second development has been the cease-fire on August 29, 2007 that Muqtada Al-Sadr ordered the Mahdi army militia to observe for six months, renewed on February 23, 2008 for six additional months.
Concurrent with these developments was the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report of November 2007, which stated with “high confidence” that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and has not restarted it. This NIE conclusion reversed the findings of a similar NIE report in 2005.
How is one to read these developments on the short-term and the long-term?
On the short-term, Washington is happy; the number of U.S. casualties dropped significantly to hastily declare success. Tehran is happy; the threat of a U.S. war against it has receded. Tehran is also happy because a substantial decrease in violence would make it difficult for Washington to stay in Iraq under the pretext of maintaining the peace. Iraq’s Arab Sunnis are optimistic; they think that in return for “Awakening,” Washington would force the Baghdad Shi'a dominated government to amend the “federalism” provisions in Iraq’s constitution and, among others, reverse Paul Bremmer’s de-baathification program, which together with dissolving Iraq’s army have turned Sunnis' lives upside down and cost hundreds of thousands their livelihood and lives.
The Al-Maliki government, however, is uneasy; the U.S./Sunni accommodation means U.S. pressure to give the Sunnis concessions. Iraq’s defense minister stated on December 22, 2007: “Iraq will not allow US-backed neighborhood patrols to become a ‘third force’ alongside police and the army.” Violent clashes between government security forces and Awakening units in certain areas have already been reported.
If the Iraqi government acquiesces to Sunni demands, Shi'a/ Sunni reconciliation would follow. If it rejects them, the sectarian violence would return.
As for maintaining the current lull in American casualties on the long-term, the prospect is a function of how Tehran would react to Washington’s actions.
Ultimately, Tehran and Washington are locked in a conflict over who would control GCC oil. Washington, being 10,000 kilometers away, has traditionally relied on military bases for decades to support Arab tribal emirs, kings, sheikhs, and sultans. Iran is next door. The Bush administration’s destruction of Tehran's great enemies to the east; the Wahhabi Talibans in Afghanistan, and to the west; Saddam’s regime in Iraq, turned Iran into the region’s major power.
Iran has a solid infrastructure of support in Southern Iraq. Most of Iraq’s 15-million Shiite population live there. Shiism’s holiest shrines are there. The prominent families of Najaf and Karbala trace their roots to long lines of marriages with the leading clerics families of Iran. Ayatollahs have cross-country followings. From Najaf and Karbala, Iranian clerics often led the world of Shiism.
Furthermore, Tehran’s men control Iraq. Strengthening Tehran’s grip on Baghdad are the personal rivalries that exist among Iraq’s Shiite leaders, particularly the Sistani/Hakeem camp (supporters of the Maliki cabinet today) and the Sadr organization. In their turf wars, these men are compelled to seek assistance from Tehran. Iran is their natural habitat.
Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani is obeyed by millions in Iraq and Iran. Born and raised in Iran, he does not accept Iraqi citizenship. Through his disciples, he has been heavily involved in the American designs on Iraq. While consolidating Shi’a control Al-Sistani, and Tehran as well, have a good reason to support the presence of the occupation troops. Notwithstanding this support, however, Al-Sistani is no friend of the American occupation. An objective of the election platform of the Al-Sistani-approved list of candidates that contested the January 30, 2005 elections was a timetable forthe withdrawal of the multinational forces from Iraq. Middle East Online reported on May 23, 2008 that Al-Sistani has been quietly issuing fatwas declaring that armed resistance against US-led foreign troops is permissible. Abdulaziz Al-Hakeem is the head of SCIRI and the Badr Brigade. Badr is a militia of thousands; created and sustained by Iran. Al-Hakeem spent most of his adult life in Iran. He is the leader of the largest Parliamentary bloc. When his older brother was assassinated in August 2003, Tehran declared three days of mourning. Al-Sistani and Al-Hakeem may be described as Tehran’s instruments to institute clerics’ control over Iraq.
Muqtada Al-Sadr may be described as Tehran’s instrument to harass U.S. forces. His father and uncle were Grand Ayatollahs. His uncle founded in 1958 the Islamic Daawa Party (IDP). IDP received big support from Tehran. Its leaders, Al-Jaafari and Al-Maliki, became Iraq’s transitional prime minister and full-term prime minister, respectively. Both men lived in exile for years in Iran.
It is inconceivable that these leaders would turn to Iraq’s Sunni neighbors for support. In Arab countries, the Shiites look to Iran for deliverance from Sunni subjugation. To Sunnis, the Shiites are heretics. Shi'a areas in Saudi Arabia are the poorest despite containing the entire oil wealth of that country. In Bahrain, the Sunni minority mistreats the 60% Shi'a majority. In Kuwait, the Shiites are second-class citizens. In Lebanon, the Shiites are underprivileged. In Yemen, the Zaydis, aShi'a sect, accuse the Sunni government of genocide. In Syria, until seizing power in 1970, the Alawite minority, a Shi'a sect, lived in abject poverty. In Iraq, until 2003, the Shi'a majority was deprived. Egyptian President Mubarak declared recently that, Shiites in Arab states were more loyal to Iran than to their own countries. The notion that Iran might encourage the GCC Shiites to demand their human rights sends shivers in GCC circles and beyond.
Divide and rule is a powerful weapon in the hand of Iran’s ayatollahs to keep Iraq’s Shi’apoliticians virtual surrogates and Tehran their ultimate arbiter. That Iran made representatives of Al-Sadr and Al-Hakeem/Iraqi government end the recent fighting in Basra (The Nation, March 31, 2008) is a case in point. It follows that it is in Tehran’s ayatollahs’ power today to decide when to direct their Iraqi surrogates to fight the Americans. The presence of American troops in Iraq is a pressure tool in the hand of Tehran's ayatollahs against Washington. Iran’s Defense Minister declared in August 2004 that these “forces would turn into a hostage” in any military confrontation with Washington.
It may be argued that in return for cooling the Bush administration's threats to attack Iran over the nuclear issue and in the expectation that peace in Iraq would mean Iraqi and US domestic pressure on Washington to withdraw its forces from Iraq, Tehran calmed Iraq. However, the recent lull in American casualties could be temporary; it would end once Washington provokes Tehran.
Regardless of whether the U.S. increases the level of its military presence in Iraq or withdraws altogether; whether the Democrats or the Republicans control the White House and/or Capitol Hill, and regardless of whether Iraq emerges from its current chaos as a single entity, a federal republic, or broken-up into three states the occupation has set in motion events that make it difficult to predict how lifting the lid on Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic tensions could lead to anything but to Iranian domination over southern Iraq, to Shi’a emboldenment everywhere, and to endless long-Term Shi’a/Sunni conflicts spilling rivers of blood and breeding hoards of Jihadists until the Sunni leaders in the region would either accept Iran’s hegemony or succeed in stopping the march of Shiism.
In his report to the Congress on April 8, 2008 General David Petraeus described the situation in Iraq as “fragile and reversible.” Washington could, of course, destroy Iran’s infrastructure militarily. But, that would not solve much in the long-term.
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5:47:00 PM EST
Feeling Anxious
A verdict on the “surge”
Three developments in Iraq since the middle of 2007 are noteworthy.
The first is the success of the U.S. in arming and funding Arab Sunnis in the Anbar Province and Baghdad to stop shooting at U.S. soldiers and to fight Al-Qaeda. Named Awakening forces, these have grown to more than 70,000 men. “Awakening” men patrol local areas. They get paid about $10 a day each by the U.S. Many were formerly a part of the Sunni insurgency against the occupiers and Iraqi government security forces as well as against the Shi'a militias of AbdulAziz Al-Hakeem (Badr brigade) and of Muqtada Al-Sadr (Mahdi army).
The second development has been the cease-fire on August 29, 2007 that Muqtada Al-Sadr ordered the Mahdi army militia to observe for six months, renewed on February 23, 2008 for six additional months.
Concurrent with these developments was the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report of November 2007, which stated with “high confidence” that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and has not restarted it. This NIE conclusion reversed the findings of a similar NIE report in 2005.
How is one to read these developments on the short-term and the long-term?
On the short-term, Washington is happy; the number of U.S. casualties dropped significantly to hastily declare success. Tehran is happy; the threat of a U.S. war against it has receded. Tehran is also happy because a substantial decrease in violence would make it difficult for Washington to stay in Iraq under the pretext of maintaining the peace. Iraq’s Arab Sunnis are optimistic; they think that in return for “Awakening,” Washington would force the Baghdad Shi'a dominated government to amend the “federalism” provisions in Iraq’s constitution and, among others, reverse Paul Bremmer’s de-baathification program, which together with dissolving Iraq’s army have turned Sunnis' lives upside down and cost hundreds of thousands their livelihood and lives.
The Al-Maliki government, however, is uneasy; the U.S./Sunni accommodation means U.S. pressure to give the Sunnis concessions. Iraq’s defense minister stated on December 22, 2007: “Iraq will not allow US-backed neighborhood patrols to become a ‘third force’ alongside police and the army.” Violent clashes between government security forces and Awakening units in certain areas have already been reported.
If the Iraqi government acquiesces to Sunni demands, Shi'a/ Sunni reconciliation would follow. If it rejects them, the sectarian violence would return.
As for maintaining the current lull in American casualties on the long-term, the prospect is a function of how Tehran would react to Washington’s actions.
Ultimately, Tehran and Washington are locked in a conflict over who would control GCC oil. Washington, being 10,000 kilometers away, has traditionally relied on military bases for decades to support Arab tribal emirs, kings, sheikhs, and sultans. Iran is next door. The Bush administration’s destruction of Tehran's great enemies to the east; the Wahhabi Talibans in Afghanistan, and to the west; Saddam’s regime in Iraq, turned Iran into the region’s major power.
Iran has a solid infrastructure of support in Southern Iraq. Most of Iraq’s 15-million Shiite population live there. Shiism’s holiest shrines are there. The prominent families of Najaf and Karbala trace their roots to long lines of marriages with the leading clerics families of Iran. Ayatollahs have cross-country followings. From Najaf and Karbala, Iranian clerics often led the world of Shiism.
Furthermore, Tehran’s men control Iraq. Strengthening Tehran’s grip on Baghdad are the personal rivalries that exist among Iraq’s Shiite leaders, particularly the Sistani/Hakeem camp (supporters of the Maliki cabinet today) and the Sadr organization. In their turf wars, these men are compelled to seek assistance from Tehran. Iran is their natural habitat.
Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani is obeyed by millions in Iraq and Iran. Born and raised in Iran, he does not accept Iraqi citizenship. Through his disciples, he has been heavily involved in the American designs on Iraq. While consolidating Shi’a control Al-Sistani, and Tehran as well, have a good reason to support the presence of the occupation troops. Notwithstanding this support, however, Al-Sistani is no friend of the American occupation. An objective of the election platform of the Al-Sistani-approved list of candidates that contested the January 30, 2005 elections was a timetable forthe withdrawal of the multinational forces from Iraq. Middle East Online reported on May 23, 2008 that Al-Sistani has been quietly issuing fatwas declaring that armed resistance against US-led foreign troops is permissible. Abdulaziz Al-Hakeem is the head of SCIRI and the Badr Brigade. Badr is a militia of thousands; created and sustained by Iran. Al-Hakeem spent most of his adult life in Iran. He is the leader of the largest Parliamentary bloc. When his older brother was assassinated in August 2003, Tehran declared three days of mourning. Al-Sistani and Al-Hakeem may be described as Tehran’s instruments to institute clerics’ control over Iraq.
Muqtada Al-Sadr may be described as Tehran’s instrument to harass U.S. forces. His father and uncle were Grand Ayatollahs. His uncle founded in 1958 the Islamic Daawa Party (IDP). IDP received big support from Tehran. Its leaders, Al-Jaafari and Al-Maliki, became Iraq’s transitional prime minister and full-term prime minister, respectively. Both men lived in exile for years in Iran.
It is inconceivable that these leaders would turn to Iraq’s Sunni neighbors for support. In Arab countries, the Shiites look to Iran for deliverance from Sunni subjugation. To Sunnis, the Shiites are heretics. Shi'a areas in Saudi Arabia are the poorest despite containing the entire oil wealth of that country. In Bahrain, the Sunni minority mistreats the 60% Shi'a majority. In Kuwait, the Shiites are second-class citizens. In Lebanon, the Shiites are underprivileged. In Yemen, the Zaydis, aShi'a sect, accuse the Sunni government of genocide. In Syria, until seizing power in 1970, the Alawite minority, a Shi'a sect, lived in abject poverty. In Iraq, until 2003, the Shi'a majority was deprived. Egyptian President Mubarak declared recently that, Shiites in Arab states were more loyal to Iran than to their own countries. The notion that Iran might encourage the GCC Shiites to demand their human rights sends shivers in GCC circles and beyond.
Divide and rule is a powerful weapon in the hand of Iran’s ayatollahs to keep Iraq’s Shi’apoliticians virtual surrogates and Tehran their ultimate arbiter. That Iran made representatives of Al-Sadr and Al-Hakeem/Iraqi government end the recent fighting in Basra (The Nation, March 31, 2008) is a case in point. It follows that it is in Tehran’s ayatollahs’ power today to decide when to direct their Iraqi surrogates to fight the Americans. The presence of American troops in Iraq is a pressure tool in the hand of Tehran's ayatollahs against Washington. Iran’s Defense Minister declared in August 2004 that these “forces would turn into a hostage” in any military confrontation with Washington.
It may be argued that in return for cooling the Bush administration's threats to attack Iran over the nuclear issue and in the expectation that peace in Iraq would mean Iraqi and US domestic pressure on Washington to withdraw its forces from Iraq, Tehran calmed Iraq. However, the recent lull in American casualties could be temporary; it would end once Washington provokes Tehran.
Regardless of whether the U.S. increases the level of its military presence in Iraq or withdraws altogether; whether the Democrats or the Republicans control the White House and/or Capitol Hill, and regardless of whether Iraq emerges from its current chaos as a single entity, a federal republic, or broken-up into three states the occupation has set in motion events that make it difficult to predict how lifting the lid on Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic tensions could lead to anything but to Iranian domination over southern Iraq, to Shi’a emboldenment everywhere, and to endless long-Term Shi’a/Sunni conflicts spilling rivers of blood and breeding hoards of Jihadists until the Sunni leaders in the region would either accept Iran’s hegemony or succeed in stopping the march of Shiism.
In his report to the Congress on April 8, 2008 General David Petraeus described the situation in Iraq as “fragile and reversible.” Washington could, of course, destroy Iran’s infrastructure militarily. But, that would not solve much in the long-term.
Written by eeh100 Blog about this entry |
Add to del.icio.us | digg this
