Sports Media Review by Jonathan Weiler

On Friday morning, Jeremy Schaap hosted a segment of Outside the Lines about big markets and small markets in baseball. It was a generally good, balanced assessment, focusing especially on the Kansas City Royals (the show was subtitled: Royal Pain, Small Market Meltdown). None of the array of guests on the show was interested in letting the Royals off the hook for their miserable play the past few seasons. Typical were the comments of Joe Posnanski, who's covered the team forever for the Kansas City Star. Posnanski asserted: "saying you can't compete is just a bogus argument." He noted that the team has been unwilling to make the commitments necessary - such as in minor league development and Latin America, that could provide a stream of good, low-cost talent.

Schaap reported that the franchise received $55 million dollars in revenue sharing alone last season, and only spent $37 million on its payroll (this year, KC's payroll is $47 million). Schaap also noted that, in 2000, Jermaine Dye, Carlos Betran and Johnny Damon comprised the Royals' starting outfield, and Brian MacRae, former Royals outfielder and current commentator for MLB.com observed that the Cleveland Indians, in the early 1990s, made a commitment to locking up good young players, like Manny Ramirez and Jim Thome, through their arbitration years, which was a springboard to their outstanding run from 1994-2001. As a useful aside, MacRae was careful to make the distinction between small markets and small revenue teams. The former, of course, implies that there are factors entirely outside of a team’s control that determine whether it can be a profitable venture. The latter suggests that even teams in small markets have somewhat more control of their fates. The Indians, in fact, perfectly exemplify this distinction, since the franchise was a cash cow for several years, enjoying 448 consecutive sell-outs from 1995 to 2001. How did they do it despite playing in a relatively small market? By putting a great team on the field and marketing that team well.

Ron Cook, who covers the Pittsburgh Pirates, observed that teams like the Yankees, when they make a mistake on free agents, can cover that loss easily enough. By contrast, small market teams, like the Pirates and Royals, will pay more dearly for such mistakes, an undeniable advantage for wealthier clubs. Cook was still extremely critical of the Pirates, noting that ownership has gotten every break in the book, from a beautiful new park, to the awarding of an extra all-star game to Pittsburgh, and that "ownership should be embarassed" by dumb signings like Joe Randa and Jeremy Burnitz and the nerve to raise ticket prices the season after losing 100 games.

The most interesting aspect of the show, however, was a brief discussion, not sufficiently explored, about what owner's obligations are to winning. Schaap pointed out that "owners are in it to make money - they have no obligation, no contract to require them to win." Schaap then asked: "do fans have a right to expect their team to even try to won?"

If a player is suspected of not giving his all for the good of the team, he will be a source of endless criticism and harsh scrutiny by sports media and fans. When owners, like the Royals' David Glass, essentially ensure that their teams cannot win, by pocketing money rather than investing in their franchise, it's striking that the focus of the conversation would shift to the legalistic terrain of "rights."

This double standard is emblematic of larger assumptions in America about the entitlements of extreme wealth, but if the suggestion that a player has a right not to always play hard seems absurd, there's no sound reason, in competitive terms, why an owner should have any comparable right. And, in fact, Schaap's question is based on an inaccurate premise. The 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement stipulates that when teams receive revenue from MLB’s shared revenue pool, they must use that money "in an effort to improve…performance on the field.” So, in fact, according to the CBA, the owners’ are obligated to make an effort to win. Enforcement, of course, is another matter. Commissioner Bud, whose Milwaukee Brewers were the most profitable team in baseball in 2001 (despite going 68-94), after taking into account revenue sharing under the old agreement, might not be the ideal guy to enforce this sort of provision. In fact, as Andrew Zimbalist points out, the Brewers’ share of revenue sharing went from $1.5 million in 2001 to 18.35 million in 2003, while payroll moved from 52 million in 2002 to 27 million in 2004. Zimbalist writes, “if Selig enforced this provision on other teams, he would also have to enforce it on his Brewers.”

As for the Royals, their payroll stood at $31 million in 1991, and was just $37 million in 2005, meaning that their payroll hadn’t even kept up with inflation though, as noted earlier, there was a more substantial increase this year. By contrast, independent observers suggest that their revenues have been increasing by 5-6% per year since 1991. In other words, as the Wages of Wins website puts it, “In essence, the Royals do not appear to be maximizing wins given their constraints, but rather, maximizing profits. Fans of the Royals, though, might not appreciate this objective.”

Outside the Lines is to be commended for, at the least, raising this larger issue. And, both Posnanski and his KC Star colleague Jason Whitlock, have long pointed out the shameful management of the Royals under Glass. But, it remains one of the least discussed scandals in sports – that in the intensely competitive crucible of major team sports in North America, owners could successfully pursue a money-making strategy that would be antithetical to actually winning. The next time there’s a big brouhaha about Manny failing to leg out a grounder, think about that.

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